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Abstract
The Internet, as a global system of interconnected networks, carries an extensive array of infor-
mation resources and services. Key requirements include good quality-of-service and protection of
the infrastructure from nefarious activity (e.g. distributed denial of service—DDoS—attacks). Network
monitoring is essential to network engineering, capacity planning and prevention / mitigation of threats.
We develop an open source architecture, AMON (All-packet MONitor), for online monitoring and
analysis of multi-gigabit network streams. It leverages the high-performance packet monitor PF RING
and is readily deployable on commodity hardware. AMON examines all packets, partitions traffic into
sub-streams by using rapid hashing and computes certain real-time data products. The resulting data
structures provide views of the intensity and connectivity structure of network traffic at the time-
scale of routing. The proposed integrated framework includes modules for the identification of heavy-
hitters as well as for visualization and statistical detection at the time-of-onset of high impact events
such as DDoS. This allows operators to quickly visualize and diagnose attacks, and limit offline and
time-consuming post-mortem analysis. We demonstrate our system in the context of real-world attack
incidents, and validate it against state-of-the-art alternatives. AMON has been deployed and is currently
processing 10Gbps+ live Internet traffic at Merit Network. It is extensible and allows the addition of
further statistical and filtering modules for real-time forensics.
Index Terms
Network monitoring, detection, identification, visualization, PF RING, gigabit streams, commodity
hardware, data products, algorithms, statistics, heavy tails, extreme value distribution, network attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation and background: The Internet has become a vital resource to business, governments
and society, worldwide. It has thrived and grown under diverse conditions and technologies with
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little to no centralized regulation. Its fundamental design principles have successfully ensured its
robustness and broad accessibility. However, these same principles do not provide centralized
management and/or monitoring of the entire network. Therefore, understanding broad based
patterns such as traffic loads and thus adequacy of capacity and quality-of-service, composition
of network traffic, adoption of new protocols and applications, are challenging tasks. Such traffic
characterization problems and the corresponding network engineering, management and capacity
planning solutions made necessary the analysis of large volumes of data, and also gave rise to
statistical techniques to handle them, such as streaming algorithms [1], [2], sketches [3]–[5],
tomography [6], [7] and analysis of heavy tails and long range dependence [8], [9].
In addition, it enables numerous vulnerabilities and security threats, both to the infrastructure
and to its user base. For example, malicious activities such as distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks are relatively easy to implement and rather hard to prevent, since best practices
like origin IP anti-spoofing (e.g., BCP38 recommendation [10]) are not universally deployed
by network operators. Their timely detection at appropriate short time-scales (e.g. in seconds)
requires processing vast amounts of meta-data (e.g., NetFlow) distributed throughout the entire
network, thus making it a challenging task. Further, the non-centrally controlled diverse hardware
and software network infrastructure, allows many additional vulnerabilities open to exploitation
by adversaries. A recent example features the exploitation of misconfigured NTP (network time
protocol) servers, that led to one of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded [11]. In such reflection
and amplification attacks [12], multiple small requests are sent to several mis-configured NTP
servers (or other UDP-based services), which inflict transmissions of large data amounts to
targeted hosts. Thus, the intended victims get overwhelmed with traffic and temporarily disabled.
Volumetric DDoS attacks are just one possible scenario; low-volume DDoS activities that rely
on traffic sparseness to avoid detection are also of concern. It is important to be able to defend
against the DDoS threat model and detect the onset of such potentially unpredictable attacks in
order to adequately secure the network, e.g., by filtering (blocking) traffic or deploying security
patches to network gear.
The key to addressing these diverse topics is the availability of adequate data coupled with
advanced monitoring and analysis tools and the corresponding software infrastructure. The vast
volume of network traffic streams makes collection, storage and processing of all traffic data
infeasible. Therefore, the focus has been on the information available in packet headers, such
as source and destination addresses, application ports, protocol, payload size, etc. While such
type of meta-data is more manageable, its rate of occurrence is still very fast. For example,
storing packet header information (say initial 96 bytes of an Ethernet frame) from a 10 GE link
at Merit1 at a rate of 1.8 Mpps (million packets per second) requires 1.7 GB per 10 seconds
(equivalently, around 15 TB per single day). The industry has developed tools such as NetFlow
and others (sFlow, etc.), which effectively compress the packet meta data by grouping them
into flows. NetFlow-alike traffic sampling functionality is available on many network elements.
This compression mechanism, however, creates an intermediate step, which introduces a delay
in the access to traffic meta-data (in addition to distorting its structure).
Even if one has access to raw data on packet headers or NetFlow, its high acquisition rate
makes online analysis of this information often a formidable challenge. Many conventional
statistical methods and algorithms are not sequential in nature and require access to large batches
of data spanning several minutes to hours. Thus, possible DDoS attacks or changes in the
network traffic patterns will be detected with offline analysis several minutes after their onset.
The time-scales of such analyses are not desirable, if the goal is to prevent large-scale network
outages. Note that specialized, albeit very expensive, appliances exist (e.g., Arbor Networks’
PeakFlow), but in real-world settings are configured to receive heavily sampled Flow data (i.e.,
sampling rates of 1:1000 or more). Hence, low-volume or short-term attacks may elude detection.
Further, such tools require a priori knowledge of baseline traffic patterns.
These challenges motivate us to develop new software and algorithmic infrastructure for
harvesting and monitoring network traffic data at the time-scale of routing (i.e., at wire-speed),
guided by the following principles: (a) examine all packets at the monitoring host; (b) develop
memory efficient data structures and statistical summaries that can be computed and retained
1Merit Network, Inc. operates Michigan’s research and education network. It is an Internet service provider that serves a
population of nearly 1 million users. Merit is the largest IP network in Michigan, and its network includes a wide range of link
types that include link speeds from T1 through 100Gbps. The network backbone consists of a 100G fiber ring, which passes
through the major cities of Michigan, as well as Chicago.
at the time-scale of routing; (c) easy to build and deploy using commodity, inexpensive, off-
the-shelf hardware; (d) the resulting data products should be available to be communicated and
shared in real-time to centralized monitoring stations for further forensics, and (e) the monitoring
architecture should allow for interactive filtering in real-time.
Related Work: Over the past 15 years, many practical tools have been developed for intrusion
detection. For example, Snort (see, snort.org), Suricata (suricata-ids.org) and Bro
(bro.org) are popular tools that rely on signature-based methods to examine traffic data for
known malicious patterns. Nevertheless, recent malware often manage to evade pattern matching
detection by becoming polymorphic (i.e., existing in various forms via encryption). The proposed
work aims to complement existing tools by adopting instead a behavioral-based approach.
There exists a noteworthy amount of literature in the area of statistical, behavior-based
anomaly detection. Standard techniques that seek ‘change detection’ points in traffic time series
include exponential smoothing [13] or other more general time-series techniques [14], [15]. More
recent methods employ wavelet-based tools [16] or subspace reduction methodologies based
on principal component analysis [17], [18]. Such methods lack the capability of identifying
the actual ‘heavy-hitters’ and, most importantly, suffer from the ‘dimensionality curse’ (i.e.,
having multi-dimensional features to monitor) and/or are inadequate for online realization on
fast, multi-gigabit streams. Hence, there has been a lot of activity in the theoretical computer
science community on designing and studying efficient algorithms for data streams that aim to
alleviate the high dimensionality and high ‘velocity’ constraints. Many summary data structures
(i.e., sketches) have been developed to address the challenging problems of identification of
heavy-hitters or frequent items in a stream [19]–[25], anomaly detection in high-dimensional
regimes [3], [24], [26], [27], compressed sensing and estimation of frequency moments [4],
[28]–[33], community mining [34], etc. (see [35] and references therein).
In reality, the mere access to fast data streams involves formidable technical challenges.
Many of the more sophisticated sketch-based algorithms (e.g., [4], [26], [28], [33]) tackle the
multi-dimensional aspect of the problem, but implementing them on multi-gigabit streams is
rather challenging or often impossible without the use of specialized hardware (e.g., FPGA).
In addition, few frameworks (e.g., [24], [26]) take a holistic approach to develop methods
TABLE I: Characterization of previous work (representative sample).
Real-time High-Dim. Real-time Interactive Attack
Identification Detection Visual. Data Streams Zoom-in Classification
AMON yes yes yes yes yes yes (ongoing work) no
CGT [19] yes no no yes yes no no
Defeat [26] yes yes no yes no no yes
[24] yes yes no yes yes no no
[18] no yes no no no no yes
[27] no yes no no no2 no no
that address the problems of change detection and identification together. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge the presence of considerable previous work on the topics of network monitoring,
troubleshooting and intrusion discovery. At the same time, our open-source platform offers a
novel extendible framework that couples together the important problems of detection, iden-
tification and visualization of aberrant behavior in multi-gigabit streams. We propose new
algorithms that are a direct consequence of the data products generated by our framework.
Furthermore, there are relatively few tools that could allow network engineers to interactively
examine 10Gbps+ traffic streams on the time scale of routing. This motivates the approach we
have adopted in this paper, which focuses on leveraging several recent advances in high-speed
packet capture to provide tools that are easy and inexpensive to deploy, examine every packet
at the interface, and provide simple statistics of the ‘signal’ that allow network engineers to (a)
visualize structural aspects of traffic, (b) detect changes in intensity or structure of traffic sub-
flows, (c) potentially filter and zoom-in on anomalous IP address ranges identified automatically
and (d) identify ranges of exact IP addresses associated with anomalous events. Table I highlights
our contributions and identifies differences with previous literature.
Major Contributions: Our first contribution is the design and implementation of a software
monitoring framework, referred to as AMON (All-packet MONitor), working reliably over 10Gbps+
links. This framework is based on PF RING [36] in zero-copy mode which efficiently delivers
packets to the monitoring application by bypassing the OS kernel. We implement hash-based
traffic summaries, which simply randomly assign source and destination pairs to bins providing
an aggregate but essentially instantaneous picture of the traffic, which can be used to diagnose
2As noted in [27], it is limited to relatively low rates in an attempt to not overload the device and affect forwarding actions.
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Fig. 1: The proposed framework. Left: AMON’s data products comprise the input of identification, statistical detection and
visualization modules introduced in this paper. Right: Performance at rates exceeding 20Gbps; minute drop rates recorded.
and visualize changes in structure and intensity.
Our second contribution is a suite of statistical tools for automatic detection of significant
changes in the structure and intensity of traffic. The accompanying instances of Boyer-Moore
majority vote algorithm [37] can be leveraged to identify precise IP addresses associated with at-
tacks; this is an important contribution as well. We illustrate the new data acquisition framework
with several views of the resulting data structures (hash-binned arrays), referred as ‘databricks’.
We show (with real data from Merit!) that even basic visualization tools and algorithms applied
to the right type of data can help instantaneously identify distributed attacks, which do not
contribute to large traffic volume (see ‘SSDP’ and ‘Tor’ case studies, Section V-D).
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces our monitoring architecture, including
the data products (Figure 2) and our software prototype; Section III introduces AMON’s iden-
tification component; Section IV discusses our statistical methodology for automatic detection.
Section V evaluates our software and algorithms on a rich set of real-world Internet data,
including four real DDoS case studies, and compares against successful and robust state-of-the-
art methods for detection and identification [19], [26].
II. DATA AND SOFTWARE INFRASTRUCTURE
An overview of the proposed architecture is portrayed in Figure 1a. The monitoring application
is installed on a machine that receives raw packets in a streaming fashion. In our prototype
at Merit Network, the monitoring probe receives traffic via a passive traffic mirror (using a
SPAN—switched port analyzer—setting) configured on a network switch. Packets are then
efficiently delivered at 10Gbps+ rates to the monitoring module via PF RING ZC. Subsequently,
all packets are processed in a streaming fashion for constructing, via efficient hashing, a data
matrix (i.e., the databrick depicted at Figure 2) and a separate matrix containing the most active
source-destination flows identified via our extension of the Boyer-Moore algorithm (Section III).
Periodically, these data products are shipped to a database for storage, further analysis and
dashboard-based visualizations. These data are analyzed through various detection algorithms
described in Section IV. Flows flagged by the detection module can be extracted for further
analysis by the corresponding filtering mode that is currently under development.
A. Data products via pseudo-random hash functions
Internet traffic monitored at a network interface can be viewed as a stream of items (ωn, vn), n =
1, 2, . . . (see e.g. [2]). The ωn ∈ Ω are the keys and vn are the updates (e.g., payload) of the
stream signal. For example, the set of keys could be all IPv4 addresses (Ω = {0, 1}32); IPv6
addresses; pairs of source-destination IP addresses (Ω = {0, 1}64); may include source and
destination ports, etc; while payloads could be bytes, packets, distinct ports, etc. Since it is not
feasible to store and manipulate the entire signal when monitoring 10Gbps+ links, we employ
hashing to compress the domain of the incoming stream keys into a smaller set. Collisions are
allowed and, in fact, expected, but the hash function is chosen so that it spreads out the set of
observed keys approximately uniformly.
Consider for example the set of IPv4 addresses {0, 1}32 and let h : {0, 1}32 → {1, . . . ,m}
be a hash function (see [25], [38], [39]) that uniformly spreads the addresses over the interval
{1, . . . ,m}. Upon observing key (s, d) of the source and destination of a packet, we compute
the hashes i := h(d) and j := h(s) and update the data matrix X = {X(i, j)}m×m as X(i, j) :=
X(i, j) + v. This matrix constitutes the first data output of our architecture and is depicted in
Fig. 2. It is emitted at periodic intervals (e.g., 1 or 10 seconds) to a centralized database for
online as well as further downstream analysis, and reinitialized. The row- and column-sums of
this matrix yield the destination- and source-indexed hash-binned arrays, also depicted on the
figure. These data products are used as inputs for the detection and visualization algorithms
described below.
Source bin
20 40 60 80 100 120
De
st 
bin
20
40
60
80
100
120
#10 5
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Sources bin
20 40 60 80 100 120
By
te
s (
log
 sc
ale
)
15.5
16
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
Destinations bin
20 40 60 80 100 120
By
te
s (
log
 sc
ale
)
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Fig. 2: Our data products. These data arrays, generated online by our PF RING-based software, are used as the basic input
structures for our detection algorithms. Left: The ‘databrick’ matrix during the ‘Library’ attack (see Section V); the apparent
horizontal stripe (at dest ‘bin’ 82) signifies traffic from multiple sources to a single destination (victim). Middle: View of sources
array, constructed by a matrix column-sum. Right: Destinations array; observe that ‘bin’ 82 stands out (notice the log scale).
B. Software implementation: PF RING-based Monitoring
The AMON monitoring application is powered by PF RING, a high performance packet
capture network socket. Modern hardware advances in CPU speeds and architecture, memory
bandwidth and I/O buses have shifted the bottlenecks in multi-gigabit packet reception into the
software stack [40], [41]. PF RING avoids unnecessary memory copies between the operating
system layers, and hence the length of the packet journey between the network interface (NIC)
and the monitoring application is shortened. Consequently, the number of CPU cycles spent for
transferring packets from their NIC entry point to the application is significantly reduced. This
leads to optimal memory bandwidth utilization [40], [41], and therefore to extremely efficient
packet processing speeds (see Figure 1b).
Our system takes advantage of the zero-copy framework that PF RING offers. In this mode,
the monitoring application reads packets directly from the network interface, i.e., both the
OS kernel and the PF RING module are bypassed. As a result, efficient monitoring is now
achievable with commodity, off-the-shelf hardware. For example, all experiments in this study
were conducted using NIC cards costing below 800 USD. Although alternative fast packet
processing schemes exist [41], PF RING was selected due to its robustness, proved efficiency
and broad versatility.
III. IDENTIFICATION: THE HASH-THINNED BOYER–MOORE ALGORITHM
The proposed architecture periodically emits a list of heavy activity stream elements that
can be used for traffic engineering purposes, accounting and security forensics. When an alert
is raised, operators can readily examine these ‘heavy-hitters’. Our identification algorithm is
based on the Boyer-Moore (BM) majority vote algorithm [37], and the idea of stream thinning
for creating sub-streams described below. The so-named MJRTY Boyer-Moore algorithm [37]
can identify exactly the majority element—the element whose volume is at least 50% of the
total—in a stream, if one exists. It solves the problem in time linear in the length of the input
sequence and constant memory. We first define the identification problem at hand.
Problem Addressed 1. (IDENTIFICATION OF HEAVY-HITTERS) Given an input stream (ωn, vn),
identify the top-K most frequent items. The frequency of key ω is the sum of its updates v.
Next, we describe the original Boyer-Moore algorithm with an analogy to the one-dimensional
random walk on the line of non-negative integers. A variable count is initialized to 0 (i.e., the
origin) and a candidate variable cand is reserved for use. Once a new key arrives, we check to
see if count is 0. If it is, that IP is set to be the new candidate cand and we move count one
step-up, i.e. count = 1. Otherwise, if the IP is the same as cand, then cand remains unchanged
and count is incremented, and, if not, count moves one step-down (decremented). We then
proceed to the next IP and repeat the procedure. Provably, when all IPs are read, cand will hold
the one with majority, if majority exists.
Our extension of the MJRTY Boyer-Moore method applied to each sub-stream is outlined in
Figure 3. It returns up to m ‘heavy-hitter’ items present in a stream of keys, taking values in
{ω1, . . . , ωN}, by ‘thinning’ the original stream S into m sub-streams. In the update operation,
upon observing a new stream item (ω, v), we compute the sub-stream index s := h1(ω) using
hash function h1. In essence, we run m independent realizations of the Boyer-Moore algorithm
described above, one for each sub-stream. Arrays count and cand hold the algorithm state
for all sub-streams, i.e., cand[s] holds the majority candidate for s. Array count is updated
accordingly with the value of v as lines 9, 11 and 16 depict. The auxiliary flag for each sub-
stream s can help track whether a majority is indeed underlying into that sub-stream; at the start
of the monitoring period the flag corresponding to s is set, and as long as count[s] remains
non-negative (i.e., cand[s] needs no updates), the flag never resets. A flag that remains ‘on’
Input: Number heavy-hitters: K, K ≤ m
Input: hash function h1 : [N ]→ [m]
Input: hash function h2 : [N ]→ [m′], m′ = 256
1: count[i] = 0, i ∈ [m]
2: cand[i] = −1, i ∈ [m]
3: flag[i] = 1, i ∈ [m]
4: Pbm[i, j] = 0, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [m′].
(a) Initialization
1: Pest[s] = maxj∈[m′] Pbm[s, j], s ∈ [m]
2: Initialize O = ∅
3: for r=1 to K do
4: Find o = Argmaxj∈[m]\OPest[j]
5: O = O ∪ o #Exclude for next iteration
6: Output ω∗r =cand[o]
7: Output Pest[o]
8: end for
(b) Query operation
1: [Thin] Compute buckets s = h1(ω) and j = h2(ω).
2: if cand[s] == −1 then
3: cand[s] = ω, count[s] = v, Pbm[s,j] = v
4: else
5: if cand[s] == ω then
6: Pbm[s,j] = Pbm[s,j] + v, count[s] = count[s] + v
7: else
8: if count[s] > 0 then
9: count[s] = count[s] - v
10: if count[s] < 0 then
11: cand[s] = ω, count[s] = -count[s] # reset cand
12: flag[s] = 0 # reset flag
13: end if
14: Pbm[s,j] = Pbm[s,j] + v
15: else
16: cand[s] = ω, count[s] = v # reset cand
17: flag[s] = 0 # reset flag
18: Pbm[s,j] = Pbm[s,j] + v
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
(c) Update operation for stream item (ω, v)
Fig. 3: Identification algorithm: Hash-thinned MJRTY Boyer-Moore.
guarantees the presence of a majority item3. An estimate of the frequency of each hitter can be
obtained via the m×m′ data structure Pbm. Through the use of an independent hash function
h2, this sketch structure keeps a hash array of size m′ for each sub-stream s, and gets updated
with the arrival of each stream element.
When a query operation is performed (see Figure 3), we retrieve the m candidates. An
estimation of the volume of a candidate ‘hot’ item s is recovered by looking at the maximum
value of sub-array Pbm[s]. The m candidates are ranked according to these estimates, and an
approximation of the set of top-K hitters is identified.
IV. STATISTICAL METHODS FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
This section introduces three new detection methods. We start with a data exploration and
model validation discussion that characterizes our data products; all methods leverage AMON’s
data. The first method is based on estimating the number of ‘heavy hitters’ at each time point;
3As an example, during the real-time 5-day experiment with the Chicago traffic (Figure 1b), an average fraction of at least
85.41% of all sub-streams (with 0.11% standard deviation) contained a majority element (for bytes).
this estimate represents a monitoring statistic that one can track, and time points with heavy
hitter activity can be flagged as anomalies. Next, a method derived by modeling the distribution
of the relative volume of the heaviest bins in the source and destination, 1-dimensional, hash-
binned arrays is introduced. This section concludes with a technique for discovering structural
changes in traffic, a method chiefly suitable for seemingly innocuous, low volume aberrant
behavior. Henceforth, the problem of anomaly detection is formulated as follows.
Problem Addressed 2. (DETECTION) Given an input traffic stream, find the time points when
the baseline probability distribution of an appropriate monitoring statistic seems inadequate.
A. Statistics, model validation and data exploration
The successful detection of statistically significant anomalies in the derived hash-binned traffic
arrays depends on the adequacy of the model employed. We undertook an extensive empirical
analysis of long hash-binned arrays and found that heavy-tails are ubiquitous. Figure 4 (left
panel, top figure) shows a time series of the linearized hash-binned array of outgoing (Source)
traffic at Merit Network for the period 17:30-18:30 EST on July 22, 2015. Observe the consistent
presence of extreme peaks in the data, some of which may in fact be due to an attack event
(see the ‘Library’ case study, Section V). By zooming-in on a short (seemingly calm) 3-minute
period—bottom right—we observe that the extreme peaks, although of lower magnitude, persist.
Heavy-tailed power law distributions are suitable statistical models for data exhibiting such
characteristics. Power laws are ubiquitous in computer network traffic measurements. It is
well known and documented that file-sizes, web-pages, Ethernet traffic, etc. exhibit power-law
tails [42], [43]. Specifically, let X = Xt(i) denote, for example, the amount of traffic registered
in a given hash-array bin i. Then, a parsimonious model for its tail is as follows:
P(X > x) ∼ c/xα, as x→∞, (1)
where ‘∼’ means that the ratio of the left- to the right-hand side converges to 1 and where α > 0
and c > 0 are constants. The smaller the exponent α, the heavier the tail of the distribution,
and the greater the frequency of extreme values. In particular, if α < 2, then the variance of X
does not exist and if α < 1, then the mean of this model is infinite.
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Fig. 4: Left panel: Time-series of Source hash-binned arrays (Top) and its zoomed-in version (Bottom-right), computed over
10-second windows. The max-spectrum of the entire time series is plotted on the bottom-left. Merit Network: 17:30-18:30 EST,
July 22, 2015. Right panel: Merit Network 16:00-17:00 EST, Aug 1, 2015 – the ‘Tor’ event in Section V-D. (Top-left) Ingress
connectivity for the top N = 3000 hash-binned flows per 10-second windows over 1-hour. (Top-right) QQ-plots demonstrating
accuracy of the Normal approximation of typical in-degree distributions. (Bottom plots) QQ-plots for anomalous bins.
Figure 4 (left panel, bottom) shows the max-spectrum of the entire 1-hour long time series
of hash-binned source traffic array. The max-spectrum is a plot of the mean log-block-maxima
versus the log-block-sizes of the data. A linear trend indicates the presence of power-law tails
as in (1), while the slope provides a consistent estimate of 1/α. Thus, steeper max-spectra
correspond to lower values of α and heavier tailed distributions generating more extreme values.
A useful feature of the max-spectrum plot is its ability to examine various log-block-sizes
(scales), thus enabling simultaneous examination of the power-law behavior in the data at various
time-scales [44]. As it can be seen, the power-law behavior (linearity in the spectrum) extends
over a wide range of time-scales from seconds to hours. The time-scale relevant to our studies
is a few seconds, which yields estimates of α ≈ 1.6, obtained by fitting a line over the range
of scales (log2-block-sizes) 1 through 6. Over intermediate time-scales (a few minutes) the
exponent α raises to about 2.5. The simple power-law models are no longer sufficient to capture
the distribution over the largest time-scales (hours), where complex intermittent non-stationarity
and diurnal trends dominate.
Alternatively, Figure 5 shows the complimentary cumulative distribution function x 7→ P(X >
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series and tail exponents of Source and Destination traffic hash-array computed over 10-second windows. Merit Network: July
22, 2015, 17:30-18:30 EST.
x) on a log-scale for both Source and Destination traffic arrays. Linear scaling on this plot
corresponds to power-law behavior as in (1) and the slope of the linear fit yields an estimate of
−α. Even though one cannot clearly talk about time-scales here, similarly to the max-spectrum
plot, one sees two regimes of power-law scaling. The heavy-tail behavior is relatively more
severe for the range of smaller values corresponding, on average, to shorter time-scales. Our
focus is on very short time scales of a few seconds to a minute. Our analysis shows that over
such time-scales, the power-law model captures the essence of the distribution. Figure 5 shows
tail exponents for both Source and Destination hash arrays Xt(i), i = 1, . . . ,m as a function
of time t. Observe the persistent heavy-tailed nature of the data throughout the entire period of
time. Note that the Source (outgoing) traffic is slightly heavier-tailed (lower exponents α) than
the Destination (incoming). Note also that the estimators of the tail exponent are rather robust to
large-volume fluctuations, e.g. in the Destination time-series. This is another important feature
of the max-spectrum, which will play a role in the successful detection of such anomalous event,
described in the following sections.
B. Detection of Heavy Hitters
In this section, we describe a methodology (named as ‘Fre´chet method’) for aberrant behavior
discovery, based on monitoring the number of hash-bins involving heavy traffic, henceforth
referred as heavy hitters. The precise definition of a heavy hitter is rather subtle; depending on
the traffic context, a given flow (e.g. video transmission) may be perceived as a heavy hitter
in light traffic conditions, while it may be in fact a ‘typical’ event in normal traffic conditions.
Here, we adopt a statistical perspective, where we flag hash-bins as heavy hitters, if their signal
exceeds a given quantile of a baseline probability distribution, i.e., we view heavy hitters as
‘outliers’. In order to be adaptive to changing traffic conditions, we shall dynamically and
robustly estimate the baseline probability model from the data. Our notion of heavy hitters
depends on the probability associated with the quantile threshold. This tuning parameter may
be set depending on how sensitive we would like to be to ‘alarms’.
Let Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1, t = 1, 2, · · · be sequence of hash-binned traffic arrays. In the case
of the source IP signal, for example, Xt(i) corresponds to the column-sum of the databrick
matrix and represents the number of bytes originating from all source IPs ω hashed to bin i,
i.e. h(ω) = i over the time-window t. Figure 2 (middle) shows an example of such array. The
process of hashing effectively randomizes traffic flows in different bins, and therefore, the entries
Xt(i), i = 1, . . . ,m may be reasonably assumed to be statistically independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.).
Our goal is to identify and flag the presence of abnormally large (heavy) traffic. One way
that this manifests itself is through abnormally large values of Xt(i)s, for some i’s. To this end,
we consider the sample maximum of the hash-array:
Dm(Xt) := max
i=1,...,m
Xt(i). (2)
We shall identify a bin i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} as a heavy hitter, if its value is large, relative to an
asymptotic approximation to the distribution of the sample maximum.
Proposition 1. Let X(i), i = 1, . . . ,m be i.i.d. random variables with heavy tails as in (1).
Then, as m→∞, we have that
1
m1/α
Dm(X) ≡ 1
m1/α
max
i=1,...,m
X(i)
d−→ c1/αZα, (3)
where P(Zα ≤ x) = e−1/xα has the standard α-Fre´chet distribution and c is the asymptotic
parameter in (1).
This result is a simple consequence of Theorem 3.3.7, p. 131 in [45]. For completeness, its
proof is given in the Appendix.
Relation (3) suggests that for relatively large values of m, we can use the limit α-Fre´chet
distribution to calibrate the detection of heavy hitters. Specifically, given a sensitivity level p0
(e.g. equal to 0.95 or 0.99), we flag the bin i as a heavy hitter, if
Xt(i) ≥ Tp0(m,α, c) := m1/αc1/αΦ−1α (p0) =
( c
log(1/p0))
)1/α
, (4)
where Φ−1α (p) = (log(1/p))
−1/α, p ∈ (0, 1) is the inverse of the standard α-Fre´chet cumulative
distribution function Φα(x) = e−1/x
α
, x > 0. This way, in practice, under normal traffic
conditions, the probability of flagging any bin in time-slot t as a heavy hitter is no greater
than (1− p0). The rate of potential false alarms, may be controlled and reduced by judiciously
increasing the level p0. On the other hand, the presence of abnormally large bins relative to the
reference distribution will be flagged if their values exceed the threshold Tp0(m,α, c).
To be able to use this methodology, one should estimate the key parameters α and c appearing
in formula (4). The recently proposed max-spectrum method in [44] is particularly well-suited to
this task. It is easy to tune, robust to outliers, computationally efficient, and it provides estimates
of both the scale parameter c and the tail exponent α. This methodology is summarized in the
formal algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Remark 1. The hash-array is obtained from the PF RING-based methodology at the time scale
of one array per several seconds. For the traffic conditions in the Merit Network (e.g. rates of
10Gbps), we found that time-windows of 10 seconds provide sufficiently well-populated bins
that lend themselves to reasonable heavy-hitter detection. In this setting, we output estimates of
heavy hitters every 10 seconds. For greater traffic rates, hash-binned arrays are populated faster
and our methodology can be applied at an even shorter, sub-second time-scale.
Remark 2. Proposition 1 is an asymptotic result. In our experiments with real traffic data, we
found the approximation based on the Fre´chet distribution to be reasonably accurate for m as
low as 128 and durations about 10 seconds.
Algorithm 1: Fre´chet method
Input: Stream of hash-arrays Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1;
probability level p0 ∈ (0, 1);
smoothing coefficient λ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: Stream of significant heavy-hitter bins
Ht ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} and their counts kt = |Ht|.
1: for each stream item Xt do
2: Estimate the tail exponent αˆ := α(Xt) and scale
coefficient cˆ := c(Xt) from the sample
Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1 based on the max-spectrum.
3: if (t = 1) then
4: Set αt := αˆ and ct := cˆ
5: else
6: Perform EWMA smoothing:
αt := λαˆ+ (1− λ)αt−1 and
ct := λcˆ+ (1− λ)ct−1.
7: end if
8: Compute the significance threshold
Tt := Tp0(m,αt, ct) using (4).
9: Estimate the set of heavy hitter
bins Ht at window t as
Ht :=
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : Xt(i) ≥ Tt
}
.
10: return Ht and kt := |Ht|.
11: end for
Algorithm 2: Relative volume
Input: Stream of hash-arrays Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1; probability
level p0 ∈ (0, 1); candidate value k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
(preferably  m); smoothing parameter λ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: Binary stream of alarm-flags ft ∈ {0, 1}.
1: for each stream item Xt do
2: Estimate the tail exponent αˆ := α(Xt) from the
sample Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1.
3: if (t = 1) then
4: Set αt := αˆ
5: else
6: Perform EWMA smoothing:
αt := λαˆ+ (1− λ)αt−1.
7: end if
8: Compute the relative volume of of the top–k bins
Vt(k) as in (5).
9: Using Monte Carlo simulations, compute numerically
the significance threshold qt = qt(p0; k, αt,m), such
that
P(Wαt(k,m) ≤ qt) ≈ p0.
10: return ft := I{Vt(k) > qt}, i.e., flag Vt(k) as
significantly large (at level p0) if Vt(k) > qt.
11: end for
C. Detection via Relative Volume
Alternatively, one can detect high-impact events by monitoring the volume of the top-hitters
relative to the total traffic. As before, suppose that Xt = {Xt(i)}mi=1 is a hash-binned array of
traffic volume (in bytes) computed over a given time window.
Sort the bins in decreasing order, so that Xt(i1) ≥ · · · ≥ Xt(ik) ≥ · · · ≥ Xt(im) ≥ 0. Fix a
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and consider the relative volume of traffic contributed by the top-k bins:
Vt(k) :=
∑k
j=1Xt(ij)∑m
j=1Xt(ij)
. (5)
Note that the indices of top-k bins can change from one time-window to the next.
We aim to identify when Vt(k) is ‘significantly’ large. For example, if k = 1, one would like
to know if the top bin suddenly carries a very large proportion of the traffic relative to the rest.
This could indicate an anomaly in the network. As in the previous section, we will measure
significance relative to a baseline probability model, which is dynamically estimated from the
data. The ubiquitous heavy-tailed nature of the Xt(i)’s will play a key role.
Let now X(i), i = 1, . . . ,m be i.i.d. non-negative random variables representing a generic
hash-binned traffic array. As argued in the previous section, in a wide range of regimes, the
distribution of the X(i)’s is heavy tailed, and they may be assumed independent because of the
pseudo-randomization due to hashing. Thus, as in (1), we shall assume that F (x) ≡ 1−F (x) =
P(X(1) > x) ∼ c/xα, for some c > 0 and α > 0. It is well-known that if the distribution function
F is continuous, then U(i) := F (X(i)), i = 1, . . . ,m are i.i.d. Uniform(0, 1). Therefore, the
Re´nyi representation for the joint distribution of the order statistics (p. 189 in [45]), implies(
X(ik)
)m
k=1
d
=
(
F
−1( Γk
Γm+1
))m
k=1
. (6)
This yields the following result about the distribution of the relative volume.
Proposition 2. (i) Under the above assumptions, we have
{V (k;m), k = 1, . . . ,m} d=
{∑k
j=1 F
−1
(Γj/Γm+1)∑m
j=1 F
−1
(Γj/Γm+1)
, k = 1, . . . ,m
}
. (7)
(ii) Under (1), for fixed 1 ≤ k < `, we have, as m→∞,
V (k;m)
V (`;m)
d−→ Wα(k, `) :=
∑k
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j∑`
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j
. (8)
The proof is given in the Appendix. Recall that our goal is to test whether V (k;m) is
significantly large. The asymptotic result in (8) suggests that the distribution of the statistic
Wα(k, `) can be used as a baseline model. Note however that it quantifies the magnitude of
V (k,m) relative to V (`,m) for some fixed `. In practice, in the context of network traffic
hash-binned arrays we studied, it turns out that V (`,m) ≈ 1 for moderately large values of
`. Therefore, the denominator in the left-hand side of (8) can be taken as 1. Further, to be
slightly conservative, one can take ` = m. We therefore obtain the distributional approximation
V (k;m)
d≈ Wα(k,m) :=
∑k
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j∑m
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j
. Note that this approximation is in fact valid exactly, if
F (x) = c/xα, x ≥ c1/α, i.e. under the Pareto model. This discussion leads to Algorithm 2.
Remark 3. In scenarios where the Pareto approximation is not as accurate, one can adapt
the above algorithm by considering ` < m and test the contribution of ratios of volumes
V (k;m)/V (`;m), relative to the baseline distribution of Wα(k, `). As indicated above, for
simplicity, and to be slightly conservative in practice, we use ` = m, which worked rather well.
The significance threshold qt in Algorithm 2 may fluctuate substantially in time, since the
tail exponent αt does (see, e.g. Figure 5 in [46]). This natural adaptivity property allows us
to dynamically calibrate to the changing statistical properties of the stream. It is important,
however, to be also robust to sudden changes of regime due to the onset of anomalies, i.e., we
should not adapt to the anomalies we are trying to detect. Such robustness can be achieved and
tuned by the smoothing parameter λ. The smaller the value of λ, the closer the αt to past values
αs, s ≤ t. Some degree of smoothing can also improve estimation accuracy through borrowing
strength from the past. In practice, we found that λ ≈ 0.5 works well in our conditions.
If the type of anomalies considered persist over several windows of time ∆, one can substan-
tially decrease the false alarm rate by considering control charts. This leads to a slight modifica-
tion of Algorithm 2. Following [47], one can consider the p-values, pt := P(Vt(k) > Wαt(k,m)),
and then apply an EWMA on the z-scores: zt := λpΦ−1(1 − pt) + (1 − λp)zt−1, for another
weight λp ∈ (0, 1). Then, under baseline conditions, zt follows the Normal distribution with
zero mean and variance σ2z = λp/(2−λp). Thus, classical process control methodology suggests
to raise an alarm if zt/σz > L, for a given level parameter L > 0 [13]. The pair of parameters
(λp, L) can be tuned so as to ensure detection of persisting anomalies, while minimizing false
alarms. Section V includes studious sensitivity analyses of these calibrations controls.
D. Community Detection
Consider now the two-dimensional matrix Xt = {Xt(i, j)}mi,j=1 of updates, obtained for a
certain time t. The technique proposed next aims at detecting changes in the community structure
of the network flows. To this end, focus on the top N bins of Xt(i, j), i, j = 1, . . . ,m, which
represent an aggregate summary of the top origin-destination flows in the network.
Let At = (at(i, j))m×m be a binary matrix, such that at(i, j) = 1 if and only if bin (i, j)
belongs to the set of top N items in the array Xt. One can view At as an adjacency matrix of
an oriented graph Gt, which is a type of a histogram of the underlying (rather sparse) graph
of flows from a given sIP to a dIP that are active over the time-window of interest. Changes
in the connectivity of Gt indicate changes in the community structure of the traffic flows. For
example, in the event of a DDoS or other distributed attacks, a given destination IP ω0 is flooded
with substantial amount of traffic from multiple source IPs. If a large number of sources are
involved, then this will likely result in a horizontal strip of relatively large values in the two-
dimensional hash-binned array. The location of the strip will be i0 := h(ω0)—the index of the
bin where the target destination IP ω0 is hashed (see, e.g. Figures 7 and 8 for visualizing the
‘Tor’, ‘SSH-scanning’ and ‘SSDP’ attack events).
One way to formally and automatically detect such features is to focus on the graph with
adjacency matrix At. In this event, the matrix At will have a relatively larger number of 1s in
the i0th row and, correspondingly, the in-degree of node i0 will be large. We propose a statistical
method for quickly identifying significant peaks in the in-degrees (or out-degrees). This method,
combined with the information from the Boyer-Moore MJRTY instances associated with the
bins involved can lead to an almost instantaneous identification of possible targets as well as
(potential) culprits of malicious activities.
Focus on ingress connectivity, i.e., let It(i) :=
∑m
j=1 at(i, j), i = 1, . . . ,m be the in-degree
associated with node i for the oriented graph Gt. Our goal is to flag statistically significant
peaks of It(i). As argued in Sections IV-B and IV-C, hashing ensures randomization and hence
It(i), i = 1, . . . ,m can be reasonably assumed to be independent. In contrast with the previous
sections, however, the distribution of the counts It(i) are no longer heavy-tailed but rather well-
approximated by a Normal distribution. For a fixed i, thanks to the randomization induced by
hashing, one can view at(i, j)’s as independent in j. Hence, for relatively large m, as well
as N and ultimately traffic rate, the CLT ensures that centered and normalized integer counts
It(i) can be modeled by the Normal distribution. Indeed, Figure 4 (right panel, top-right plot)
shows Normal quantile-quantile plots of It(i), t = 1, . . . , T for 5 typical (non-anomalous) bins
i. The linearity in the plots indicates agreement with the Normal distribution. The heatmap
therein (top-left) shows the entire array (It(i))m×T of in-degrees computed over 10-second time
windows over the duration of 1 hour. We focused on the top N = 3000 flows. The bottom
plots in this figure show the QQ-plots corresponding to anomalous bins with high in-degree
corresponding to the higher intensity lines in the top-left plot.
Given the above discussion, in the baseline regime, we shall assume that It(i), i = 1, . . . ,m
are independent N (µt, σ2t ). Then for Dt := maxi=1,...,m It(i), by the independence of the It(i)’s,
we obtain P(Dt ≤ x) = Φ
(
x−µt
σt
)m
, where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Fix a probability level
p0 (e.g. 0.99), and consider the significance threshold ut(p0) ≡ u(p0,m, µt, σt) := µt+σt×p1/m0 .
Thus, in the baseline regime, all in-degrees It(i), i = 1, . . . ,m lie below ut(p0) with probability
p0. As in Section IV-B, we shall flag all bins i, for which It(i) exceeds ut(p0) as anomalous.
The detection algorithm is analogous to Algorithm 1, except that now one should estimate the
parameters µt and σt. This can be similarly done using an EWMA of the empirical means and
standard deviations of the samples It(i), i = 1, . . . ,m. We omit the details to avoid repetition.
This method is illustrated in Section V, where it is successfully employed in mining seemingly
harmless events characterized by high node-connectivity (e.g., the ‘SSDP’ and ‘Tor’ cases).
These events are harder to detect via the methods described in Sections IV-B and IV-C.
Remark 4. Observe that the access to various cloud services and resources can have similar
characteristics, where multiple source IPs communicate with a single destination IP (server).
Such servers, however, are typically well-known and can be a priori filtered out. An alternative
application of this methodology is to track the up-surge of users to a particular service, such
as Twitter, Facebook or Google, for example. Such up-surges, not necessarily due to malicious
activity, may be of interest to network engineers or researchers.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Software performance
The excellent performance of PF RING is well documented [40], [41]; this section focuses
instead on our monitoring application. We perform measurements in situations where AMON
is deployed in the field, and under heavy stress-testing with a traffic generator appliance.
Figure 1b (right) illustrates our software capabilities when monitoring traffic at Merit’s main
peering point in Chicago. Our setting involves a passive monitor (i.e., packet tap) receiving traffic
from four SPAN 10GE ports. The mirrored traffic includes both ingress and egress network
traffic, and a 5-day snapshot of aggregate volume is shown in Figure 1b. Note that traffic
rates are well above 20Gbps; however, AMON monitoring traffic from all four 10GE ports
simultaneously, experienced minimal packet drops (below 1.5%). Further, the amount of physical
memory required by our application was only around 40MB, something expected from the low
space complexity of the Boyer-Moore algorithm [39].
To shed more light into this, we undertook performance tests using a traffic generator with
40 byte payload packets (i.e., sending at the minimum frame of 64 bytes). At wire-speed of
10Gbps we measured throughput that exceeded 12 Mpps (million packets per second). This
corresponds to a drop rate of 18%; testing with payloads of size 96 and above showed zero loss
at wire speeds. We conjecture that the bottleneck seems to be the buffer size of the NIC card
we used, and not PF RING. In particular, the Intel card we tested has buffers of size 4096, and
hence packet drops seem to be inevitable at these rates.We are in the process of conducting
tests on cards with larger buffers in order to verify our hypothesis.
B. Identification accuracy
Next, we demonstrate the identification accuracy of MJRTY Boyer-Moore; we perform com-
parisons against Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) [19]. We utilize an hour-long NetFlow
dataset, collected at Merit, with 92 million flows and an aggregate volume of 447 GBytes and
around 580 million packets. Both methods are evaluated against the ground truth (i.e., exact
recovery of top-K hitters). All methods report their answers every 100,000 NetFlow records;
Table II illustrates the average proportion of identified heavy hitters among the top-K and the
standard error (in parenthesis). The chosen data contain a low-volume DDoS attack attributed
to the Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP); see Figure 8 (left).
The CGT method [19] is a probabilistic technique, based on the ideas of ‘group testing’. It
aims at finding the elements whose volume is at least 1/(k + 1) of the total; this is a relaxed
version of the top-K hitters problem. The authors provide performance guarantees with respect
to accuracy, space and time. It is suited for high-speed streaming data; indeed, besides its offline
evaluation on accuracy, we have implemented the method in the AMON framework and verified
its time and space efficiency. Its online realization demonstrated results similar to Figure 1b.
For the results of Table II we sought the top source IPs per interval. The tuning parameters for
CGT include the hash-table size W , and the number of groups T (in all experiments, T = 2;
increasing T improves accuracy but worsens the efficiency on real-data). The granularity unit b
TABLE II: Identification; comparison with Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) [19].
Top-K hitters BM (m=512) BM (m=1024) CGT (k=500,W=1024) CGT (k=1000,W=2048) CGT (k=2000,W=4096)
K=10 (packets) 0.99(0.04) 0.99(0.03) 0.91(0.10) 0.91(0.10) 0.89(0.09)
K=10 (bytes) 0.99(0.03) 0.99(0.03) 0.79(0.14) 0.85(0.12) 0.86(0.11)
K=50 (packets) 0.94(0.04) 0.98(0.02) 0.90(0.07) 0.90(0.05) 0.90(0.04)
K=50 (bytes) 0.96(0.03) 0.98(0.02) 0.80(0.11) 0.89(0.06) 0.90(0.05)
K=100 (packets) 0.85(0.05) 0.94(0.03) 0.60(0.11) 0.89(0.05) 0.90(0.03)
K=100 (bytes) 0.90(0.03) 0.96(0.02) 0.58(0.09) 0.86(0.09) 0.92(0.04)
K=200 (packets) 0.71(0.05) 0.87(0.03) 0.30(0.06) 0.76(0.12) 0.91(0.03)
K=200 (bytes) 0.77(0.04) 0.90(0.02) 0.29(0.05) 0.48(0.08) 0.78(0.13)
(see [19], Sec. 3.3) is set to b = 8 for better efficiency, at the expense of space in memory.
The MJRTY BM is regulated with the number of sub-streams, m. Note that, regarding space
utilization, hashing with size m = 1024 corresponds to the CGT case W = 1024. In all cases,
we used W ≥ 2k, per Lemma 3.3 in [19]. The results of Table II showcase that MJRTY BM is
highly accurate in finding the most frequent elements of the stream. It also often outperforms
its competitor. CGT’s performance can increase with elevated values of W and T at expense
of space and, most importantly, time. However, MJRTY BM can increase its accuracy too
by stretching m. Finally, we note that CGT, being a probabilistic algorithm, may output IP
elements that are not present in the stream (due to hash collisions). Conversely, MJRTY BM is
not susceptible to this.
C. Detection accuracy
We shed light into the detection accuracy of our methods by considering real-world DDoS
case studies as well as synthetic attacks injected on real data. The studied attacks were recorded
at Merit’s NetFlow collector. The first event, labeled as ‘Library’ case study, involved heavy
UDP-based DNS and NTP traffic to an IP registered to a public library in Michigan, and is
considered a volumetric attack (see Figure 6). The second event, named ‘SSDP’, is a low-volume
attack directed to another host within the network (see Figure 8, left).
We implemented the Defeat [26] subspace method and juxtapose its performance against
our algorithms on the two attacks. Defeat checks for anomalies using principal component
analysis (PCA). A dictionary of entropies is built, over moving windows, of distributions of
certain signature signals involving source and destination ports and IP addresses. In Defeat,
abnormalities are viewed as unusual distributions of these features. The Defeat framework is
well-suited for multi-dimensional data due to its sketch-based design, and can be utilized for
detection, identification and classification of attacks. However, its requirement for construction
of empirical histograms makes it less appealing (if any feasible at all) for online realization.
Table III tabulates our analyses. We report two metrics, namely precision and recall. Precision
depicts the fraction of alerts raised that are indeed relevant, and recall captures the ratio of actual
anomalies that were detected. The ground truth (i.e., instances that the attack was ongoing)
was obtained by offline data analysis that revealed the times when the target IPs and the
corresponding protocol ports ranked among the top-10. Again, we considered time windows
of 100,000 flow records. Due to the fact that additional attacks unknown to us might be present
in the data, the precision criterion should be interpreted as a worst-case, lower bound.
The Defeat method was calibrated by the significance level α (necessary for its monitoring
statistic threshold) and the number of ‘votes’ raised by Defeat’s internal detection processes. A
sketch of size 484 was employed. For our system, we ran all three detection methods and reported
their results; we also demonstrate the overall AMON accuracy by accounting the union of alerts.
As illustrated in Table III, both Defeat and AMON perform remarkably well on ‘Library’. Recall
that this event is a voluminous one, and hence both techniques can easily detect it. On the other
hand, the ‘SSDP’ case is a harder one (see Figure 8). Defeat reports true alerts for a higher
time fraction, and both methods show consistent and similar false positive rates. The fact that
Defeat checks for more traffic features than our methods seems to be the explanation of its
higher attack discovery rate. However, we emphasize that AMON indeed rapidly uncovered the
underlying event during its period of appearance. Further, it is extensible and adding monitoring
features like source and destination ports into its design is straightforward.
The Defeat method works well but is rather sophisticated and requires a training period. This
training process is computationally intensive and has to be performed offline. Moreover, the
construction of signal distributions and entropy calculations, required to run the PCA-based de-
tection requires very large memory structures, which do not scale well in real network conditions.
Making this method work in real-time requires a formidable and independent effort. Further,
finding a sufficiently long, anomalous-free period that satisfies the stationarity assumption might
TABLE III: Detection accuracy; comparison with Defeat [26].
(a) The Library case study
Method Prec. Recall
Defeat (α = 0.01) 0.95 0.94
Defeat (α = 0.001) 0.80 0.95
Fre´chet (p = 0.95, λα = 0.6) 0.89 0.22
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 1.64) 0.80 0.48
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.74 0.95
AMON (all methods) 0.94 0.93
Fre´chet (p = 0.85, λα = 0.6) 0.65 0.41
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 1.64) 0.80 0.48
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.74 0.95
AMON (all methods) 0.94 0.93
Fre´chet (p = 0.95, λα = 0.6) 0.89 0.22
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 2) 0.80 0.29
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.74 0.95
AMON (all methods) 0.95 0.93
(b) The SSDP case study
Method Prec. Recall
Defeat (α = 0.001, 9 votes) 0.35 0.80
Defeat (α = 0.001, 10 votes) 0.31 0.21
Fre´chet (p = 0.95, λα = 0.6) 0.40 0.03
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 1.64) 0.47 0.12
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.34 0.45
AMON (all methods) 0.33 0.46
Fre´chet (p = 0.85, λα = 0.6) 0.36 0.13
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 1.64) 0.47 0.12
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.34 0.45
AMON (all methods) 0.33 0.47
Fre´chet (p = 0.95, λα = 0.6) 0.40 0.03
Rel. Vol. (λp = 0.6, L = 2) 0.52 0.06
Connectivity (p = 0.9999) 0.34 0.45
AMON (all methods) 0.34 0.46
be challenging. Its adaptability in dynamically changing traffic conditions is another concern.
In contrast, our methods are highly adaptive to traffic trends and require no training.
To grasp insights into AMON’s sensitivity to various tuning parameters we can study Table IV
and Table V. For this evaluation, we utilized data collected during a seemingly ordinary period.
We randomly injected attacks of various magnitudes at 5 times; the injected traffic volume occurs
directly on the databrick matrices. We first considered the scenario of many sources sending
traffic to one destination. In this scenario, one databrick row is ‘inflated’ by the synthetic attack
magnitude at 5 random instances. The algorithm input was the destinations hash-binned arrays
(see Figure 2), and we allowed a grace period of 3 minutes for detection. Each individual
experiment was repeated 50 times and we report the average performance in terms of precision,
P
(1)
d , and recall, R
(1)
d ; sub-script ‘d’ denotes that the algorithm input was the destinations’ signal.
We also considered the scenario of one source communicating with multiple destinations (see
P
(2)
s and R
(2)
s ), and the case of several sources to various destinations (rightmost four columns).
Table IV tabulates results for Algorithm 1, which is tuned by the significance level p0 = p and
the smoothing parameter λ = λα. Best performance is achieved with p = 0.95 and λα = 0.50.
Note that p may be calibrated to ease the false alarm rate. Further, observe the connection
TABLE IV: Fre´chet method (Algorithm 1)
p λα Gbps P
(1)
d R
(1)
d P
(2)
s R
(2)
s P
(3)
s R
(3)
s P
(3)
d R
(3)
d
0.95 0.50 0.50 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.74 1.00
0.95 0.50 1.50 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.74 1.00
0.95 0.50 2.50 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.74 1.00
0.95 0.60 0.50 0.72 0.93 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00
0.95 0.60 1.50 0.74 0.99 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.99
0.95 0.60 2.50 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00
0.99 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.73 0.74 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
0.99 0.50 1.50 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.99 0.50 2.50 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
0.99 0.60 0.50 0.76 0.24 0.36 0.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.99 0.60 1.50 0.92 0.40 0.08 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.99 0.60 2.50 1.00 0.55 0.16 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
between robustness and adaptivity as dictated by λα. Recall that this parameter is used to
smooth the heavy-tail exponent, α. Big traffic spikes translate to a heavier distribution tail and
thus a low α; this could make our scheme too insensitive/conservative if we do not have an
adaptive scheme that accounts for ‘historical’ α’s. On the other hand, high α can make our
scheme too sensitive (i.e., many false positives). Table V illustrates the detection performance
of a modification of Algorithm 2, which utilizes EWMA control charts on z-scores, as explained
at the end of Section IV-C. We employ our methodology for the EWMA (λp, L) pairs shown
and λ = λα was fixed to 0.5. For this evaluation, our synthetic attacks were persistent for 5
consecutive time slots (i.e., 50 seconds). Users can tame the alert rate by increasing the control
limits with a higher L and/or decrease further λp.
In addition, we undertook sensitivity analysis with respect to various choices of monitoring
intervals used to generate databrick matrices. Table VI illustrates that at the relevant time-scale
of interest (e.g., few seconds), detection accuracy remains relatively unchanged. For optimal
performance, very brief aggregation intervals for low-traffic links are discouraged because the
hash-binned arrays will be sparse. Similarly, very large aggregation levels (e.g., minutes) are also
TABLE V: Relative volume method (Algorithm 2)
L λp Gbps P
(1)
d R
(1)
d P
(2)
s R
(2)
s P
(3)
s R
(3)
s P
(3)
d R
(3)
d
2.00 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.98 0.61 0.97 0.49 0.99 0.35 0.99
2.00 0.50 1.50 0.45 0.99 0.62 0.96 0.41 0.99 0.33 1.00
2.00 0.50 2.50 0.45 0.98 0.64 0.98 0.41 0.99 0.34 1.00
2.00 0.60 0.50 0.61 0.98 0.80 0.96 0.74 0.99 0.45 1.00
2.00 0.60 1.50 0.62 0.97 0.81 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.41 0.99
2.00 0.60 2.50 0.60 0.98 0.81 0.97 0.48 0.99 0.40 0.99
3.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.62 0.76 0.25 0.95 0.99 0.78 0.99
3.00 0.50 1.50 0.98 0.74 0.62 0.16 0.73 0.98 0.60 0.98
3.00 0.50 2.50 1.00 0.81 0.90 0.36 0.58 0.98 0.55 0.99
3.00 0.60 0.50 0.96 0.42 0.50 0.13 0.99 0.98 0.92 0.98
3.00 0.60 1.50 1.00 0.59 0.40 0.10 0.79 1.00 0.65 1.00
3.00 0.60 2.50 1.00 0.72 0.56 0.13 0.71 1.00 0.59 1.00
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Fig. 6: The ‘Library’ event. The left panel shows the time-series of the hashed-array for destinations for a period of one
hour. Note the dark horizontal stripe (at bin 82) between minutes 30 and 45 and towards the end of the hour. The adjacent
panel depicts the aggregate traffic volume over the hour of interest. Observe the elevated traffic volume and note that both the
Fre´chet and the relative volume methods correctly raised alerts (red) during the malicious activity period (rightmost figures).
unwelcome since short-duration attacks might be masked by collisions with other events. Further,
the heavy-tail modeling assumption is not suitable on large time-scales (see Section IV-A).
We conclude this section be showcasing that AMON’s identification may synergistically be
coupled with the detection alerts to guide operators’ troubleshooting and mitigation efforts. By
looking at the database of heavy hitters reported by MJRTY BM, network managers can readily
have an IP list of candidate culprits. Upon detection, our algorithm outputs a databrick bin,
aimed to identify culprits. One can then examine the flows reported by Boyer-Moore of the
sub-streams associated with the relevant hash bin. For example, one first sorts these Boyer-
TABLE VI: Sensitivity on aggregation level (‘Library’ case)
Fre´chet method
(p = 0.85, λα = 0.6)
Relative Volume
(λp = 0.6, L = 1.64)
Aggregation Level Precision Recall Precision Recall
200K NetFlow records 0.74 0.52 0.82 0.53
300K NetFlow records 0.76 0.73 0.87 0.70
400K NetFlow records 0.92 0.71 0.81 0.75
500K NetFlow records 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.76
TABLE VII: ‘Library’ case study: culprit identification using MJRTY Boyer-Moore.
Top-K 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128
Fre´chet method (Alg. 1) - time fraction (%) 39.7 60.3 74.0 90.4 93.2 98.6 100 100
Rel. Vol. (Alg. 2) - time fraction (%) 42.7 61.3 74.7 90.7 93.3 98.7 100 100
Moore-identified flows based on their traffic volume estimate (Pest in Algorithm 3), and then
proceeds with forensics analysis. In particular, for the ‘Library’ event, in 39.7% of the flagged
times by Algorithm 1, the top ranked flow by Boyer-Moore was indeed one of the (src, dst)
pairs of interest (see Table VII, top row). For a 60.3% fraction of times, the same detection
method was able to identify flow(s) of interest among the top-two reported BM flows, etc.
Similar reports are offered by the second detection algorithm at the bottom row.
D. Diagnosing low-volume attacks
In addition to orchestrated, volumetric attacks that seek to overwhelm the victims with traffic,
low-volume DDoS attacks can be pernicious, albeit problematic to detect. Such attacks, like the
‘SSDP’ event previously analyzed, rely on presumably innocuous message transmissions to
thwart standard anomaly detection methods. In this section, we highlight the importance of
visualizations and of methods that detect structural patterns (see Section IV-D) in traffic in
revealing these low-profile nefarious actions. As an initial example, consider Figure 8 (bottom
left). The bold horizontal line in the depicted databrick is an artifact of the distributed nature
of the ‘SSDP’ attack. Operators can easily, instantaneously and visually observe such patterns
by monitoring AMON’s live data products. Further, we reiterate the important role that the
connectivity algorithm played in automatically uncovering the ‘SSDP’ instances (see Table IIIb).
Figure 7 depicts another case study of this kind in which sparse traffic patterns (left panel)
make Algorithms 1 and 2 to miss these events. As clearly seen by the in-degree counters of
Figure 7 (middle), two possibly suspicious events are occurring. Manual inspection revealed the
first event to be UDP misuse affecting a Tor exit router within Merit, and the other (longest
running) attempts of SSH-breaking into Michigan-located servers from IPs that belong at an
autonomous system registered in the Asia-Pacific region. We refer to this case study as ‘Tor’.
The right panel illustrates that both events were flagged by our community detection system.
This plot shows the number of highly connected destinations (i.e., high in-degree) over the
duration of an hour. The correct hash bins were also reported (22 and 53).
Further, Figure 8 (right panels) demonstrates extra visualization aids readily available by
our data products; cliques and clique sizes for the sources and destinations co-connectivity
graphs are depicted. A co-connectivity graph for sources provides insights into the number
of common destinations between two sources; the destinations co-connectivity graph sheds
similar information for destinations. To obtain these (undirected) graphs we utilize the binary
matrix At = (at(i, j))m×m (see Section IV-D). The co-connectivity graph for destinations Dt is
efficiently obtained as Dt := At · ATt ; the graph for sources is St := ATt · At, where ATt is the
transpose of At. Based on the co-connectivity graphs one can obtain visualizations about the
cliques formed, over time. Figure 8 showcases two such snapshots. These graphs are portrayed
as their matrix adjacency representations, and we have re-arranged the node labeling based on
the node-degree in decreasing order (i.e., the first row represents the adjacency associations of
the node with the highest degree). Note the very large clique formed in src-to-src graph. This
depicts the situation in the ‘Tor’ case study discussed above, when a plethora of sources were
contacting the same destination (the Tor exit router). One may also extract the maximum clique
for each graph; the bottom row demonstrates this characteristic over time. The reader is pointed
to our supplement [48] for an animated version of Figure 8, where clearly one can observe the
clique sizes evolving and expanding over the duration of the ‘Tor’ event.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents a novel open source monitoring architecture suitable for multi-gigabit
(i.e., 10Gbps+) network traffic streams. It is based on PF RING Zero-Copy and tailored for
deployment on commodity hardware for troubleshooting high-impact events that may arise from
malicious actions such as DDoS attacks. It is worth noting that the NIC needed for processing
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Fig. 8: Visualizations readily available by our data products. Left: Merit Network 10:00-12:00 EST, Dec 9, 2015 – the
faint ‘SSDP’ event (in volume) is clearly observable in the time snapshot of the databrick matrix (horizontal line). Top Right:
Adjacency matrices of co-connectivity graphs (node indices sorted by degree—black corresponds to locations of 1’s). Bottom
Right: Size of max cliques over time during the ‘Tor’ case study (Section V-D). By observing clique size changes in Dashboards
like this, coupled with the detection method of Section IV-D, such seemingly innocuous low-volume events are captured.
traffic data at speeds around 25Gbps (Figure 1b) costs roughly 800 USD, while specialized FPGA
accelerated cards or monitoring appliances cost an order of magnitude higher (above 10,000
USD). We demonstrated the performance of our system architecture and the underlying statistical
methods on selected real-world case studies and measurements from the Merit Network.
Our framework is extensible, and allows for further statistical, filtering and visualization
modules. Currently, we are in the process of deploying an interactive filtering mode of operation
that would enable network operators to zoom-in and examine IP ranges of interest in real-
time. As an example, consider the ‘Tor’ and ‘SSH-scanning’ events of Figure 7 for which
our methods automatically flagged bins 22 and 53. With the filtering option, operators can
rapidly zoom exclusively into the sub-stream of traffic that gets mapped into the flagged bins.
Note that due to randomization, these hash-bins are not associated with traditional IP-ranges
(e.g., subnets or specific IP addresses). Thus, such filters cannot be implemented using existing
filtering infrastructures such as BPF or hardware-based filters.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. This result is a simple consequence of Theorem 3.3.7, p. 131 in [45].
Proof: By the independence of the X(i)’s, for all fixed x > 0, we have
P(m−1/αDm(X) ≤ x) = P(X ≤ m1/αx)m = (1− P(X > m1/αx))m.
Now, by (1) with x replaced by m1/αx, we observe that P(X > m1/αx) ∼ c/(mxα), as m→∞.
Thus, using the fact that (1− cx−α/m)m → e−c/xα , m→∞, we conclude that
P(m−1/αDm(X) ≤ x) −→ e−c/xα , as m→∞.
This implies the desired convergence in (3), since P(c1/αZα ≤ x) = e−c/xα , x > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof: Part (i) is a direct consequence of (6). Now, to prove (ii), observe that by (7),
V (k;m)
V (`;m)
d
=
∑k
j=1 F
−1
(Γj/Γm+1)∑`
j=1 F
−1
(Γj/Γm+1)
. (9)
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers, we have that Γj/Γm+1 ∼ Γj/m, as m → ∞, almost
surely, for all j = 1, . . . , `. Recall that ` is fixed. Thus, in view of (1), F
−1
(p) ∼ (p/c)−1/α, as
p ↓ 0, and hence for all j = 1, . . . , `, with probability one, we have
F
−1( Γj
Γm+1
)
∼
( Γj
cΓm+1
)−1/α
, as m→∞.
This implies that the right-hand side of (9) converges almost surely to∑k
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j (cΓm+1)
1/α∑`
j=1 Γ
−1/α
j (cΓm+1)
1/α
= Wα(k, `),
which completes the proof of (8).
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